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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

MARION S. GOELTZ,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
THE CONTINENTAL BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, a
Utah banking corporation,

Case No. 8408

Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THE'REOF

PE'TITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now defendant in the above entitled
matter and respectfully petitions this court for a
re-hearing of the decision heretofore entered on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

July 27, 1956 on the following grounds and for the
following reasons:
.,
I. The court erred in deter~ining that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to allow appellant bank to amend its complaint to
place in issue the Statute of Limitations.
II. The court erred in determining that the
new evidence of plaintiff did not substantially affect the question of the Statute of Limitations.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PE'TITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF P·OINTS
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCREITION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT
BANK TO AMEND ITS COMPAINT TO PLACE IN
ISSUE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE NEW EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF
DID NO'T SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE QUESTION
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

A'RGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCREITION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT
BANK TO AMEND ITS COMPAINT TO PLA·CE IN
ISSUE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The court court ruled that justice did not require this amendment to the pleadings. It further
asserted that "to defeat a claim by the bar of the
2
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Statute of Limitations is not a determination of a
case on its merits." It is submitted that such a statement implies that the Statute of Limitations lacks
merit as a defense- that it has a taint of legalism
and formality to be frowned upon. Such an attitude
is contrary to the many pronouncements of this
court and of courts generally, that the defense is
a meritorious one performing a salutary purpose.
(See for example, Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244,
158 P. 426). It is, therefore, a statement not supported by the rulings of this very court.
It is submitted that in frowning on a technical defense on one hand, this court has on the other
hand used legal reasoning of the utmost technicality
to deny the Bank relief.
Defendant bank from the outset of this action
entered a plea a laches. The doctrine of laches was
applied, as we all know, by the courts of equity for
identical purposes as the Statute of Limitations was
applied by courts of law. Indeed, courts of equity
in applying the doctrine of laches often looked for
guidance to the Statute of Limitations. The doctrine of laches is, in fact, more demanding than the
Statute.
"The defense of laches is different from
the defense of the statute of limitations in
this, that in order to bar a remedy because
of laches there must appear, in addition to
mere lapse of time, some circumstances from
3
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which the defendant or some other person
may be prejudiced, or there must be such
lapse of time that it may be reasonably supposed that such prejudice will occur if the
remedy is allowed; whereas in the case of
the statute of limitations there need be nothing more than mere lapse of time in order to
constitute a bar." 34 Am. Jur. p. 15, Limitations of Action Section 15.
The Bank by seeking to amend to assert a less
demanding test, certainly cannot be said to have
prejudiced Plaintiff. It is clear that Plaintiff from
the moment this case was at issue, knew the question of lapse of time would be raised in this case.
She knew full well that the Bank contended that
an unreasonable and improper period of time had
elapsed between the pledge of the stock certificates
and the commencement of her action.
This contention was never waived. The Bank
merely sought to amend its pleadings to more properly classify its basic claim-(ie. to conform to a
legal rather than equitable action.)
A layman would have understandable difficulty
in understanding the historical distinction between
courts of law and equity. He would be even more
confused to find that while these two systems now
operate through the same courts and judiciary, the
powers and issues of the two systems are still kept
distinct in certain matters. But to explain to a lay4
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man how because the attorney raised the issue of
an improper lapse of time, but chose to classify this
issue by the language of the court of equity rather
than law, and to find that this linguistic lapse precluded a determination of the issue on its merits,
is impossible. It smacks of medieval sophistry and
the esotericism of the common law forms of action,
rather than the liberal common sense of our modern
procedure.
In what way did such an amendment prejudice
Plaintiff? It would not vary in any way the evidence offered. It did not even surprise Plaintiff, who
already knew that the issue of lapse of time had
been raised and would be urged.
Thus, we submit that justice does indeed require a resolution at this point on its merits.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE NEW EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF
DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE QUESTION
OF THE STATiUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

'This court in its opinion, appears to concede the
possible applicability of the Statute of Limitations
to this case. It asserts, however, that as "No new
evidence was discovered during the trial which made
this defense available where it had not been available
under the facts known by the bank in the first instance", the trial court did not abuse its discretion
5
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in failing to allow an amendment so that this issue
could be decided on its merits.
It js earnestly contended that the statement
does not reflect the record in this case and is inconsistent with the court's own decision.
In Plaintiff's deposition taken prior to trial
a.,nd th~ filing of an answer, as this court admitted,
was one where ''Plaintiff indicated that she had
endorsed the transfer clause on all three of the
original certificates an·d left them with her broker."
Assuming this to have been the case (and if the
Plaintiff ·herself so stated, certainly the bank was
justified in relying on the fact that the question of
the genuiness of the endorsements was not an issue)
there was no reason for Defendant to raise the question of the Statute of Limitations. If there were no
forgery, then as the dissenting opinion indicated,
the bank could rely on the protection of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, and in addition it did raise
the issue of estoppel.
However, at the trial, Plaintiff radically
changed her testimony, asserting contrary to her
previous testimony at the deposition, that all but
one o fthe certificates had forged endorsements.
The significance of this change in testimony
was .readily apparent to all parties and to the trial
6
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court as well. The trial was broken off in media res
for a period of months while this evidence could be
developed.
The significance of the change in evidence was
shown by the steps taken by Plaintiff to establish
this newly asserted fact. Expert testimony was procured and extensive argument made.
This court asserted "Nor did the surprise testimony have any bearing on the question of whether
Plaintiff's claim was based on the Statute of Limitations." This court further stated that the amendment proposed by the bank was made ''not because
of new evidence which brought into operation that
Statute but because the new evidence materially
weakened another and entirely different defense
of estoppel."
It is submitted that to the contrary, there was
a strong correlation between the new surprise evidence and the defense of the Statute of Limitations.
According to Mrs. Goeltz's earlier testimony, the
bank was faced with a case where Mr. Goeltz
pledged stock properly en·dorsed by his wife to which
he had always had access. This raised questions of
apparent authority and presented a case of a transfer quite proper on its face. Effective arguments
as to estoppel could be made on these facts.
7
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Forgery removes the case from the subtleties
of apparent authority. We are now faced with patent theft and conversion. A wrong upon which the
Statute of Limitations commenced to run was committed immediately upon the removal and pledge
of the certificates. Gone was the fuzziness of proving conversion where, with an un-forged document,
the existence of apparent authority was strongly
probable. In its place was a clearly defined wrong
commi~tted at a clearly defined time.
While appellants do not dispute the assertion
of this court that the determination of forgery
would have a bearing in weakening Appellant's
arguments as to estoppel, it strongly urges that there
is nothing incompatible between this and the fact
that this new evidence strongly reinforces the bank's
position as to unreasonable lapse of time.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that a rehearing
should be granted and that the decree of the trial
court be reversed and that defendant and appellant
be allowed to amend its pleadings so that the question of the Statute of Limitations might be decided
on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
PETER W. BILLINGS
ALBERT J. COLTON
Fabian, Clendenin,
Moffat & Mabey
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